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In this paper we introduce the cost channel of monetary policy (e.g.,
Ravenna and Walsh, 2006) into an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model of a two-country monetary union, which is being hit by aggregate,
asymmetric and idiosyncratic shocks. The single central bank implements
the optimal discretionary monetary policy by setting the union interest
rate.The cost channel makes monetary policy less e⁄ective in combatting
in￿ ation, but it is shown that the optimal response to the decline in e⁄ec-
tiveness is a stronger use of the instrument. Moreover, we show how the
sign of the spillover e⁄ects of idiosyncratic shocks depends on the strength
of the cost channel. If the cost channel exceeds a well-de￿ned threshold,
then the interest rate turns into a supply-side instrument.
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11 Introduction
New Keynesian models have been extensively used to study the transmission
of monetary impulses to business cycles ￿ uctuations. It is common to assume
that monetary policy a⁄ects the real economy and the in￿ ation rate primar-
ily via the demand side. A higher interest rate causes a decline in aggregate
demand, output and employment, and, eventually, in wages and prices. Grow-
ing empirical evidence, however, suggests that the interest rate also enters into
the marginal costs of production (see, for instance, Barth and Ramey, 2001;
Ravenna and Walsh, 2006; Chowdhury et al., 2006; Tillmann, 2008). A higher
interest rate matters for the pricing decision of ￿rms and thus for in￿ ation and
output dynamics. Ignoring the cost channel skews the real picture of the mon-
etary transmission process and distorts the guidelines for the design of optimal
policy rules. This paper carefully models both the demand and the supply side
e⁄ects of monetary policy. We will introduce the cost channel into an other-
wise standard New Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which
is being hit by aggregate, asymmetric and/or idiosyncratic shocks. Our focus
will be on the question how the optimal discretionary monetary policy response
depends on the strength of the cost channel.
The microeconomic rationale for the cost channel is the existence of liquidity
constraints for ￿rms in the factor markets (see Christiano et al., 2005; and
Chowdhury et al., 2006). Firms have to pay for production inputs before they
receive revenues from selling their products. They borrow funds from ￿nancial
intermediaries to ￿nance the outlays for the inputs. A rise in the interest rate
translates into a rise in marginal costs and product prices.
The conduct of monetary stabilisation policy in the presence of a cost channel
has not received much research attention. This is surprising, since the design of
optimal monetary policy in a currency union has been studied extensively. Lane
(2000) shows that the optimal response to perfectly asymmetric shocks is to "do
nothing". Benigno (2004) studies the implications of di⁄erent degrees of price
stickiness among member countries for the optimal target of in￿ ation. Only if
the member countries share the same degree of nominal rigidity, it is optimal to
stabilise the price level for the union as a whole. Lombardo (2006) emphasises
the importance of country-speci￿c degrees of product market competition for
the design of optimal monetary policy. If the currency union has a trade linkage
with the rest of the world, the strict in￿ ation stabilisation is no longer the ￿rst
best policy and a partial stabilisation of the exchange rate is desirable (de Paoli,
2009; Cecioni, 2010). Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005)
focus on the optimal mix of monetary and ￿scal policy. From the viewpoint of
the union the optimal policy plan requires that union in￿ ation is stabilised by
the single central bank, whereas ￿scal policy, implemented at the country-level,
should stabilise idiosyncratic shocks. Ferrero (2009) moves one step further by
introducing a government budget constraint. He shows that a balanced budget
rule generates ￿rst-order welfare losses, allowing for variations in government
debt is superior.
In a seminal paper, Ravenna and Walsh (2006) investigate the role of the
2cost channel for the design of optimal monetary policy. They show that, under
optimal monetary policy, the output gap and in￿ ation are allowed to ￿ uctuate
in response to both productivity and demand shocks. However, they restrict
their analysis to the case of a closed economy and ignore all international link-
ages. Tillmann (2009a) introduces uncertainty about the true size of the cost
channel into the model of Ravenna and Walsh. Since an uncertain monetary
authority tends to overestimate the price e⁄ect of an interest rate hike, the in-
terest rate response to in￿ ation is smaller, uncertainty makes the central bank
less aggressive.
This paper contributes to these two strands of literature by the incorporation
of a cost channel into a two-country model of a monetary union. The cost
channel makes monetary policy less e⁄ective in combatting in￿ ation, but, as we
will show, the optimal response to the decline in e⁄ectiveness is a stronger use
of the instrument. In the presence of a cost channel, policymakers are generally
more aggressive. This result complements Tillmann (2009a). Moreover, we
show that the spillover e⁄ects of idiosyncratic shocks very much depend on the
strength of the cost channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the
basic structure of the model, the building blocks are the IS relation, the Phillips
curve and the interest rate rule. In Section 3 we present the solution of the
model, Section 4 discusses the optimal monetary policy, along with the in￿ ation
and output dynamics of di⁄erent shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Structure of the Model
We consider a world of two countries, (H)ome and (F)oreign. The countries form
a monetary union with a single central bank. Countries produce di⁄erentiated
commodities, all goods are traded. Labour and product markets are imperfectly
competitive, and ￿rms set prices subject to a Calvo (1983) scheme of staggered
price adjustments. Labour serves as the only input. Following Barth and Ramey
(2001), Christiano et al. (2005), and Ravenna and Walsh (2006), we introduce
a cost channel by assuming that (a fraction of) ￿rms have to pay their wage
bill before they sell their product. Firms borrow at the riskless nominal interest
rate set by the central bank.
2.1 The IS Relation
The population of the union is a continuum of households on the interval [0;1].
The population of the segment [0;n) belongs to Home, while the population
of [n;1] belongs to Foreign. All households have identical preferences de￿ned
over consumption Ct and total hours worked Lt. The utility of a representative














where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the discount factor, ￿ is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and ￿ is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply.














t are the consumption baskets of Home and Foreign goods,
respectively. These baskets are themselves CES aggregates across Home and
Foreign brands. The elasticity of substitution between the two bundles of goods
is restricted to unity. Empirically, the unitary assumption seems warranted (see
Bergin, 2006).
The consumer price index for Home, pcH





t is the producer price index for Home goods, and pF
t is the producer
price index for Foreign goods (variables written in lower case letters are log
deviations from the deterministic steady state of that variable). Let qt ￿ pF
t ￿pH
t
represent the terms of trade. Then the Home (Foreign) consumer price index
can be written as
pcH
t = pH
t + (1 ￿ n)qt; pcF
t = pF
t ￿ nqt: (3)
There are no impediments to trade, so the law of price holds for each brand.
And since preferences are assumed to be identical in the entire union, absolute
purchasing power parity holds: pcH
t = pcF










the Foreign rate of consumer price in￿ ation. The Home and Foreign rates of







respectively, di⁄er across countries.
The allocation of resources encompasses three choices: the choice between
consumption today and consumption in the future (savings), the choice between
the baskets of Home and Foreign goods, and the choice between brands. The




t+1 ￿ ￿￿1(Rt ￿ Et￿w
t+1): (4)
Here cw
t is aggregate consumption in the union, Rt is the nominal interest rate,
and Et￿w
t+1 is the expected consumer (and producer) price in￿ ation in the union.
In a next step, households split consumption expenditure into purchases of
1For convenience, we omit any household index and interpret all variables in both per-
capita and aggregate terms.
4Home and Foreign goods. Aggregate demand for Home and Foreign goods, cH
t
and cF
t , respectively, can be expressed as
cH
t = (1 ￿ n)qt + cw
t ; cF
t = ￿nqt + cw
t : (5)
The demand for Home (Foreign) goods is increasing (decreasing) in the terms
of trade qt. This is the well-known open economy expenditure-switching e⁄ect.
The strength of the terms-of-trade e⁄ect is increasing in 1 ￿ n, the weight of
Foreign goods in the consumption index (2). The goods market equilibrium in




t , where yH
t and yF
t are the




t as aggregate (union) output gap. With this at hand, the
demand side of the economies can be stated as
yH
t = (1 ￿ n)qt + Etyw




t = ￿nqt + Etyw
t+1 ￿ ￿￿1(Rt ￿ Et￿w
t+1) + uF
t : (7)
In (6) and (7), we have added the demand shocks uH
t and uF
t , which are assumed














u;t are zero mean white noise processes, and ￿u 2 [0;1]. These
equations represent the IS relations in our two-country model of a currency
union.
2.2 The Phillips Curve
Monopolistically competitive ￿rms aim to maximise the current value of pro￿ts.
Each ￿rm chooses the optimal price subject to three constraints: a downward
sloped demand schedule for its product, a production function describing the
technology, and a Calvo (1983) scheme of price adjustment where each ￿rm may
reset its price with probability ￿ in any given period. Assuming that the steady
state is characterised by zero in￿ ation in both countries, the evolution of the













1￿￿ (see, e.g, Gali, 2008). In analogy to the assumption on
the properties of the demand shocks the exogenous supply shocks, "H
t and "F
t ;














";t are zero mean white noise processes, and ￿" 2 [0;1].






Real marginal costs, mcH
t and mcF




t + zRt; mcF
t = wF
t ￿ pF
t + zRt; (12)
and, due to the cost channel, increasing in the nominal interest rate set by the
central bank. Firms are assumed to face a liquidity constraint in the factor
markets. Factors of production have to be paid before goods markets open and
￿rms can sell their products. Here, labour is the only factor of production. Thus
the wage bill is the maximum amount ￿rms must borrow at the beginning of a
period from ￿nancial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries receive deposits
from households and supply loans to ￿rms at the nominal interest rate Rl
t.
For simplicity we can approximate the lending rate Rl
t by the policy-controlled
risk-free interest rate Rt. Any wedge between these two interest rates will be
captured by the parameter z ￿ 0, which measures the strength of the cost
channel. Note that it is the nominal interest rate, which enters into the ￿rms￿
real marginal costs. The expected in￿ ation rate does not matter, since loans
are assumed to be supplied and repaid within a period. After goods have been
produced and sold in the goods market, ￿rms repay loans at the end of the
period. There is no accumulation of debt.
Let us take a closer look at some features of the economy determining the
strength of the cost channel. According to Rabanal (2007), the larger the frac-
tion of ￿rms facing a liquidity constraint, the higher z is. This line of reasoning
rests on the assumption that only the interest rate on external funds raise the
marginal costs of production. Barth and Ramey (2001), and Chowdhury et al.
(2006), however, argue that all ￿rms are a⁄ected by the cost channel. The con-
cept of opportunity costs implies that the logic of the e⁄ects of interest rates on
￿rms￿costs also applies when ￿rms are primarily ￿nanced by internal funds. A
less controversial feature detemining z is the degree of interest rate pass-through.
In imperfect ￿nancial markets the change in the lending rate may even exceed
the change in the central bank rate, i.e. ￿nancial market restrictions amplify
the e⁄ects of the cost channel. The parameter z is thus not restricted to lie
between zero and one (see de Bondt, 2005; Chowdhury et al., 2006; Ravenna
and Walsh, 2006; and Tillmann, 2009a). And ￿nally, we can refer to almost all
the factors put forward in the literature on the balance-sheet channel and the
￿nancial accelerator in order to substantiate the supply-side e⁄ects of monetary
policy (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; and Bernanke et al., 1999).
The empirical evidence about the importance of the cost channel varies
across countries and over time. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) ￿nd a cost channel
coe¢ cient of about unity for the U.S. Tillmann (2008) provides supportive evi-
dence for a signi￿cant cost channel for the Euro area. This result is con￿rmed
by Henzel et al. (2009). The study of Chowdhury et al. (2006) suggests that
the strength of the cost channel varies in accordance with di⁄erences in ￿nancial
systems. For countries with a highly regulated ￿nancial sector such as Germany
6or Japan, they do not ￿nd a signi￿cant cost channel. However, for countries
with a more market-based system such as in the UK or in the U.S., the au-
thors estimate a coe¢ cient of about unity. Tillmann (2009b) argues that the
coe¢ cient for the U.S. follows a U-shaped pattern. The cost channel was most
important in the pre-Volcker era and less important in the Volcker-Greenspan
period. Recently, due to Tillmann, the cost channel regained quantitative im-
portance. This in turn con￿ icts with Gabriel and Martins (2010), who claim
that the cost channel is poorly identi￿ed for the U.S.
With regard of the model, nominal wages are set either by individual house-
holds (see e.g. Blanchard and Gali, 2010) or by non-atomistic trade unions (see
Gnocchi, 2009). In all labour market settings the wage setting institution is
interested in the real wage in terms of the consumer price index. We can thus
proceed by assuming that the real consumer wage is a0 constant markup over
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Observing
the period utility function in (1) we get
wH
t = pcH
t + ￿ ct(H) + ￿ lH
t ; wF
t = pcF
t + ￿ ct(F) + ￿ lF
t ; (13)
where ct(H) is the consumption of a Home household and ct(F) is the consump-
tion of a Foreign household, respectively. Notice that the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply ￿ turns out to be the employment elasticity of wages.
Next we rewrite the Phillips curve (9). We insert the wage (13) into (12)
and substitute the result into the in￿ ation equation (9). Then, by observing
technology (11), the de￿nition of the consumer price index (3), product market
equilibrium, and aggregate demand (5), we yield for Home in￿ ation: ￿H
t =
￿Et￿H
t+1 + ￿(1 ￿ n)(1 + ￿)qt + ￿￿ ct(H) + ￿￿cw
t + ￿zRt + "H
t . Note that Home
in￿ ation is increasing in the terms of trade. If the (relative) price of Foreign
goods increases, the Home consumer price index increases, and so does Home
wages, Home marginal costs, and Home in￿ ation.
Assuming that households have access to a complete set of state contin-
gent securities (complete asset markets), the marginal utility of consumption
and thus (per-capita) consumption itself is equalised across countries, ct(H) =
ct(F) = cw
t .2 Subsequently we use cw
t = yw
t = yH
t ￿ (1 ￿ n)qt to arrive at the
following Home Phillips curve:
￿H
t = ￿Et￿H
t+1 + ￿(1 ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)qt + ￿(￿ + ￿)yH
t + ￿zRt + "H
t : (14)
The Foreign Phillips curve is given by
￿F
t = ￿Et￿F
t+1 ￿ ￿n(1 ￿ ￿)qt + ￿(￿ + ￿)yF
t + ￿zRt + "F
t : (15)
Real marginal costs and thus product prices and current in￿ ation will be in-
creasing in the central bank interest rate. Since the demand e⁄ect of a higher
interest rate - consumption, production, employment, wages, real marginal costs
and thus prices decline - works in the opposite direction, the overall e⁄ect of a
higher interest rate on current in￿ ation is a priori ambiguous.
2If asset markets are incomplete and/or purchasing power parity does not hold, a risk
sharing condition is needed to ensure an optimal risk allocation (see De Paoli, 2009).
72.3 The Welfare Objective
The common central bank chooses the union-wide nominal interest rate Rt to
maximise the utility of the representative household given by (1). As this op-
timal policy problem is non-linear, a closed form solution cannot be derived.
Hence we are restricted to an approximation of the welfare objective. In the
literature it is by now fairly standard to use the linear-quadratic approach de-
veloped by Sutherland (2002) and Benigno and Woodford (2012). We obtain
the objective function from a second-order Taylor series expansion of (1) around
















terms of order three and higher. The per-period deadweight loss function Dt is
given by
Dt = ￿y(yw
t )2 + ￿￿(￿w
t )2 (17)
where the ￿-weights are combinations of the structural parameters of the model.
Note that the derivation of (16) and (17) rests on the assumption that Home and
Foreign do not di⁄er with respect to the structural parameters. In particular,
the degree of price stickiness and the strength of the cost channel are assumed
to be identical across countries. If there were di⁄erences in these parameters,
the per-period deadweight loss function would also include the terms of trade
and the in￿ ation di⁄erential between Home and Foreign (see e.g. Benigno, 2004;
Ferrero, 2009, and Cecioni, 2010). In our model, however, in￿ uencing national
di⁄erences is not at the disposal of the central bank. Neither the terms of trade
nor the in￿ ation di⁄erential are a⁄ected by monetary policy directly, so that
these terms are part of t:i:p.
3 Solution of the Model
The derivation of the optimal monetary policy assumes the following sequence
of events. First, households set their in￿ ation expectation, Et￿H
t+1 and Et￿F
t+1,
then period t demand and supply shocks are revealed. Given the realisations of
the shocks, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate. Next, wage setters
decide on the wage, and ￿rms decide on the product price and take up a loan to
￿nance the wage bill. Employment is pinned down, and production takes place.
After selling the products on the goods market ￿rms repay the loan.
3We follow (large parts of) the literature in assuming that steady state distortions are
eliminated by appropriate ￿scal subsidies.
83.1 The Aggregate Bloc
For a variable X, an aggregate (union) variable Xw is de￿ned as weighted
average of the national variables, Xw
t ￿ nXH
t +(1￿n)XF
t . The relative variable
XR is de￿ned as XR ￿ XH ￿ XF. From aggregation of (6) and (7) we get
yw
t = Etyw




t denotes the aggregate demand shock. For union in￿ ation we obtain
from (14) and (15):
￿w
t = ￿Et￿w
t+1 + ￿(￿ + ￿)yw
t + ￿zRt + "w
t : (19)
In the presence of a cost channel monetary policy shifts both the IS curve and
the PC curve. Inserting the IS into the PC curve delivers union in￿ ation as





Rt + ￿zRt + :::
The ￿rst term is the demand e⁄ect, whereas the second term is the cost e⁄ect
of a change in the interest rate. An increase in Rt lowers current consumption
by ￿￿1 times the change in Rt. As a consequence, the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure declines, and wage setters reduce their
wage claim by ￿ times the change in consumption. Since lower consumption
corresponds to lower output and employment, the marginal rate of substitution
declines even more, reinforcing the wage decline by ￿ times the decline in em-
ployment. Firms face a decline in their marginal costs. The lower the degree of
price stickiness (high ￿), the higher the pass-through to producer price in￿ ation.
The cost channel, on the other hand, equals z times the change in Rt, and the
impact on in￿ ation also depends on ￿. To summarise, if the cost channel is very
strong, that is, if z >
￿+￿
￿ , then the cost channel outweighs the demand channel.
An increase in Rt pushes in￿ ation up. In such a scenario the interest rate turns
into a supply-side instrument. Note that z > 1 is necessary but not su¢ cient
for a dominant supply-side e⁄ect. For a similar result see Schmitz (2011).
Combining the IS and the PC curve in a slightly di⁄erent manner leads to
the Monetary Policy Curve MPC. By substituting (18) into (19) to eliminate
the interest rate, we get:
￿w
t = ￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿z) yw





The MPC curve depicts all combinations of in￿ ation and output, which can
be chosen by the central bank by varying the interest rate. The MPC curve is
positively sloped for a dominant demand channel, ￿+￿￿￿z > 0; and negatively
sloped for a dominant cost channel (see Figure 1 below). If there is no cost
channel (z = 0), the MPC curve coincides with the PC curve. For z > 0, MPC
is ￿ atter than PC.
9The optimal policy plan consists of maximising (16) with respect to yw
t ,
￿w
t and the interest rate Rt, subject to the sequence of constraints given by the
aggregate demand curve (18) and the aggregate Phillips curve (19). Rearranging




￿￿￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿z)
yw
t : (21)
Depending on the strength of the cost channel, the optimal policy ends up
with in￿ ation and output gaps which are of equal sign (dominant cost channel,
￿+￿￿￿z < 0) or of di⁄erent sign (dominant demand channel, ￿+￿￿￿z > 0).
We will pick up this result in section 4, where the optimal policy plan will be
discussed in more detail.
In the presence of a cost channel, the determinacy (and stability) of the
equilibrium deserves particular attention, see Surico (2008). In order to describe
the behaviour of the union in￿ ation gap, we write (21) at period t + 1, take
expectations and substitute into (20) to eliminate current and expected output.
The path of ￿w
t is then given by the following expectational di⁄erence equation:
￿w
t =












with A ￿ ￿￿￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿z) and N0 ￿ ￿y + ￿
2￿￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿z)2 > 0. Equilibrium
determinacy requires the coe¢ cient
￿
(￿ + ￿z)￿y ￿ ￿￿zA
￿
=N0 to be less than
one. As necessary and su¢ cient condition for a unique rational expectations
equilibrium we get
z <




￿y + ￿￿￿￿(￿ + ￿)
￿ : (23)
If the parameter z is smaller than the threshold (23), the union in￿ ation gap
returns to its pre-shock steady state value. If the strength of the cost channel,
however, exceeds the threshold (23), a demand and/or supply shock sets into
motion an unstable process for the union in￿ ation and output gap. In the
absence of a cost channel (z = 0), the determinacy condition is unambigously
ful￿lled.
A dominant cost channel is consistent with equilibrium determinacy, if the








￿y + ￿￿￿￿(￿ + ￿)
￿ :
If the degree of price stickiness is high, that is, if ￿ <
￿(1￿￿)
￿+￿ , then the interval
is not empty.
103.2 The Di⁄erence Bloc
In this subsection, the analysis is focussed on the di⁄erential behaviour of the
two countries which make up the monetary union. In particular, output and
in￿ ation di⁄erentials are considered to measure relative macroeconomic perfor-
mance. From (6) and (7), we can write relative output as
yR
t = qt + uR
t : (24)
The nominal interest rate vanishes, i.e. a change in Rt a⁄ects aggregate demand
but not the distribution of demand between Home and Foreign. Exactly the
opposite is true for the terms of trade, a change in qt does a⁄ect only the
output di⁄erential but not the aggregate. In particular, the larger is qt, the
larger is the expenditure e⁄ect towards Home goods, and thus the larger is the
output di⁄erential.
Using the Phillips curves (14) and (15), we obtain for the in￿ ation di⁄erential
￿R
t = ￿Et￿R
t+1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)qt + ￿(￿ + ￿)yR
t + "R
t : (25)
The current in￿ ation di⁄erential depends on its expected value next period and
the current output di⁄erential. Moreover, a rise in the terms of trade causes the
rate of Home consumer in￿ ation to rise. To avoid an erosion of the real wage
in terms of consumer prices, wage setters raise the wage. Home ￿rms respond
with an increase in the price of their output generating a positive in￿ ation
di⁄erential. The interest rate does not matter, relative output and relative
in￿ ation are insulated from monetary policy.
The terms of trade evolve according to
qt = qt￿1 ￿ ￿R
t : (26)
The current period terms of trade is a function of its past value, thus the past
level of the terms of trade is a state variable. As a consequence, neither the
in￿ ation rates nor output jump to their new steady state level after a shock,
but converge gradually to the new equilibrium.


















where a0, a1 and a2 are positive constants as de￿ned in the Appendix. The dif-
ference bloc is stable. Neither the output nor the in￿ ation di⁄erential explodes.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, we investigate the optimal monetary response to demand and
supply shocks. We will distinguish between aggregate shocks, (perfectly) asym-
metric shocks and idiosyncratic shocks.
114.1 Demand Shocks
In this subsection our focus will be on shocks in product demand. The aggregate
and the di⁄erence bloc can be solved separately. Setting "H
t = "F
t = 0, that is,





























t = (1 ￿ ￿1)qt￿1 + CuR
t (T5)




























+ [nzG + (1 ￿ n)C]uH
























t￿1 + n[zG ￿ C]uH
t + [(1 ￿ n)zG + nC]uF
t (T10)
The coe¢ cients are de￿ned in the Appendix. Note that the derivation of the
national variables (T7) - (T10) makes use of the fact that Home and Foreign
variables can be expressed as XH
t = Xw







Assume a positive aggregate demand shock: uH
t = uF
t > 0. For z = 0, our
model replicates a well-known result: yw
t = ￿w
t = 0. An aggregate demand
shock will be o⁄set by varying the interest rate. The interest rate necessary
to bring back in￿ ation to target is identical with the interest rate necessary to
close the output gap. There is no trade-o⁄between the in￿ ation and the output
target (see Clarida et al., 1999). This "textbook" solution, however, does not
hold in the presence of a cost channel. The cost channel drives a wedge between
the output and the in￿ ation target.
For z > 0, the sign of the output gap depends on the strength of the cost
channel. If the demand channel dominates, ￿+￿￿￿z > 0, we have yw
t < 0; if the
cost channel dominates, ￿+￿￿￿z < 0, we have yw
t > 0, see (T1). The in￿ ation
gap does not switch the sign, ￿w
t will be positive for all parameter constellations,
see (T2). Figure 1 illustrates. The demand and the supply side are captured by
the vertical IS-curve and the positively sloped PC-curve, respectively. Point A
is the deterministic (pre-shock) steady state with yw
t = 0 and ￿w
t = 0. Point A
also represents the welfare-maximising (loss-minimising) combination of yw
t and
￿w
t . The indi⁄erence curves (combinations of yw
t and ￿w
t with equal loss) are
ellipses with the centerpoint A. The smaller the distance to point A, the smaller
is the loss.
Figure 1 about here
The aggregate demand shock shifts the IS-curve to the right (point B). Thus,
positive output and in￿ ation gaps emerge, and welfare declines. The optimal
response of the central bank depends on z. We assume that, at ￿rst, the demand
channel will dominate. To improve welfare, the central bank raises the interest
rate, see (T3). Contrary to a world without a cost channel, where the central
bank can choose between all points on the PC curve, the monetary authority
is now confronted with a Monetary Policy Curve MPC. As mentioned above,
the MPC curve depicts all combinations of in￿ ation gap and output gap, which
are feasible for the central bank. For a low value of z, the MPC curve is pos-
itively sloped. Starting from point B, the increase in the interest rate moves
the economy along the MPC (z low) curve. Closing the output gap leads to
point C, while closing the in￿ ation gap leads to point D. But neither C nor D
are optimal. The optimal monetary policy plan is given by point E, where an
indi⁄erence curve is tangent to MPC. Since the cost channel makes monetary
policy less e⁄ective in combating in￿ ation, the central bank accepts a positive
in￿ ation gap. The optimal in￿ ation rate is lower than the in￿ ation rate at point
C, so that the increase in the interest rate is larger than the increase necessary
to close the output gap. Consequently, a negative output gap emerges as part
of the optimal policy plan. The welfare-maximising increase in the interest rate
is magni￿ed by the cost channel, so that the cost channel will make the optimal
monetary policy more aggressive.
13Supposing that the cost channel dominates, the interest rate will turn from
a demand into a supply side instrument. Graphically, the MPC curve exhibits
a negative slope. The sign of the change in the interest rate is ambiguous now.
If point B is the point of tangency between an indi⁄erence curve and MPC (z
high), the optimal monetary response is to do nothing. If the tangent point
lies to the northwest of point B, it is optimal to increase the interest rate.
This lowers the output gap, but widens the in￿ ation gap. Point F is the most
"unorthodox", as this is where the optimal in￿ ation-output combination lies to
the southeast of point B. Then it is optimal to reduce the interest rate. The
positive demand shock will be reinforced, but due to the strong cost e⁄ect, it is
most e⁄ective to reduce in￿ ation via a lower interest rate.
Asymmetric and Idiosyncratic Shocks
A perfect asymmetric demand shock, de￿ned as uH
t = ￿uF
t , maximises the
output and the in￿ ation di⁄erentials, and thus the sum of national losses. Union
output and union in￿ ation, however, remain unaltered. A perfect asymmetric
shock does not provoke any policy response, uR
t does not enter into the optimal
interest rate rule (T3). The central bank may recognise the losses at the national
level, but due to the assumed symmetry in the transmission process, the central
bank can not a⁄ect country di⁄erentials. The optimal policy is to do nothing
(see Lane, 2000). It should be clear that the "do nothing"-result does not hold
in a world where the strength of the cost channel is country-speci￿c.
National (idiosyncratic) shocks a⁄ect both aggregate and relative demand.
Take, for instance, an unexpected increase in Foreign government spending:
uF
t > 0 and uH
t = 0. Such a shock will increase aggregate demand (uw
t > 0),
whereas relative demand decreases, uR
t = uH
t ￿ uF
t < 0. On impact Foreign
output as well as Foreign in￿ ation will increase. This in turn will raise demand
for Home goods for two reasons. Firstly, a higher Foreign income pushes up
demand for Home goods. Secondly, Foreign in￿ ation implies a deterioration
of its terms of trade, and demand switches from Foreign to Home. Now the
monetary authority comes into action. Let us start with the case z = 0. The
loss-minimising response to the increase in aggregate demand is a rise in the
interest rate causing households to shift consumption from the current period
into the future. Current consumption will then fall in Home and Foreign.
For z = 0, the decline in aggregate consumption neutralises the positive
demand shock, aggregate demand declines to the pre-shock level. From Foreign￿ s
point of view, there are three e⁄ects, the positive government spending shock,
the decline in consumption demand due to the upward shift in the interest rate,
and the negative expenditure switching e⁄ect due to the deterioration of the
terms of trade. As indicated by (T9), the net e⁄ect is always positive. In
terms of Foreign output, the increase in the interest rate and the worsening
of the terms of trade only mitigate the positive government spending shock.
The optimal monetary policy does not reverse the sign of the impact e⁄ect,
the Foreign output gap remains positive. The same holds true for the Foreign
in￿ ation gap, see (T10).
In the presence of a cost channel, the results are less clear-cut. Assuming
14that the demand channel outweighs the cost channel, ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿z > 0, then,
compared to the case z = 0, the increase in the interest rate is even stronger,
and the optimal policy plan will now require a negative union output gap, see
(T1). As a consequence, consumption declines even more, which may turn the
response of Foreign output negative. This can be seen from (T9), where the sign
of
h
nB ￿ (1 ￿ n)z￿￿A
N1
i
is ambiguous. The cost channel magni￿es the pressure
on Foreign in￿ ation. As can be seen from (T10), the strength of the in￿ ation
e⁄ect is increasing in the strength of the cost channel.
How do the spillover e⁄ects on Home output and in￿ ation look like? The
improvement of Home￿ s terms of trade implies a demand switch from Foreign to
Home. On the other hand, the optimal monetary policy requires an increase in
the interest rate which will lower consumption demand. The net e⁄ect on Home
output is unambiguously negative, that is, the increase in the interest rate lowers
the demand for Home goods more than the increase in Home exports to Foreign.
This result, which holds true even for z = 0 (see (T7)), immediately follows from
the de￿nition of union output as the weighted average of the national outputs.
The optimal monetary policy closes the output gap at the union level (z = 0),
the Foreign output gap remains positive, therefore the Home output gap must
be negative. The Home in￿ ation gap will be negative too, see (T8). If there is
a cost channel, the central bank acts even more aggressively, the interest rate
hike will be larger, and Home consumption and thus Home output will decline
even more, see (T7). An expansionary demand shock in Foreign, combined
with the optimal monetary policy, thus generates a negative spillover on Home,
Home output goes down. However, due to the in￿ ationary pressure of the cost
channel, the sign of the Home in￿ ation gap will now be ambiguous. Depending
on the parameter constellation the coe¢ cient [zG ￿ C] may be positive, zero or
negative, see (T8).
Finally, let us have a closer look at the case of a dominating cost channel,
￿+￿￿￿z < 0. Depending on the parameter constellation, the optimal monetary
policy will be an increase or a cut in the interest rate (see (T3), where A is
negative now). Either way, at the union level the output and the in￿ ation gap
will remain positive. Since monetary policy is less aggressive, the decline in
Foreign consumption does not outweigh the positive demand shock, Foreign
output increases unambiguously, see (T9). The spillover on Home output may
now become positive, see (T7).
4.2 Supply Shocks
In this subsection we will discuss the optimal monetary response to negative
cost-push shocks ("w
t > 0) and/or favorable technology shocks ("w
t < 0). Again,
we distinguish between aggregate shocks, (perfectly) asymmetric shocks and
idiosyncratic shocks. The demand shocks are now assumed to be zero: uH
t =
uF
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where K and N2(z) are de￿ned in the Appendix. Note that @A
@z < 0 and @N2
@z < 0.
Aggregate Shocks
An aggregate cost-push shock ("H
t = "F
t = "w
t > 0) shifts the Phillips curve
upwards. On impact, a union in￿ ation gap emerges, whereas union output
remains unaltered. In Figure 2, the economy moves from the starting point A
to point B with utility level uB. A cost-push or productivity shock drives a
wedge between the output and the in￿ ation target even in the absence of a cost
channel. For z = 0 the central bank chooses the welfare-maximising point on
the shifted PC curve (point C). The optimal policy is an increase in the interest
rate, see (T13), so mitigating the in￿ ationary e⁄ect of the cost-push. But there
16will be no full accomodation. Because of a negative output gap (see (T11))
the optimal monetary policy will tolerate an in￿ ation rate above the target, see
(T12).
For 0 < z < (￿ + ￿)=￿ the trade o⁄ between in￿ ation and output worsens.
A given increase in the interest rate and thus a given decline in output is now
accompanied by a higher in￿ ation rate. In Figure 2 the monetary policy curve
MPC, representing all feasible combinations of union in￿ ation and output, is
￿ atter than the PC curve (but still positively sloped). Point C with utility level
uC is no longer available, the new equilibrium point D with uD < uC lies to the
northwest of point C. The cost channel makes monetary policy less e⁄ective in
combatting in￿ ation, but the optimal response to the decline in e⁄ectiveness is
a stronger use of the instrument.
For a strong cost channel, z > (￿+￿)=￿, MPC is negatively sloped. Now it is
optimal to respond to a cost push with a decline in the interest rate. The IS curve
shifts to the right, the PC curve shifts down, the loss-minimising combination
of ￿w
t and yw
t lies to the south-east of point B (and to the north-east of the
starting point A).
Figure 2 about here
Asymmetric and Idiosyncratic Shocks
A perfect asymmetric cost-push shock ("H
t = ￿"F
t ) very much resembles
a perfect asymmetric demand shock. The optimal monetary policy is to do
nothing, the relative supply shock "R
t does not enter into the interest rate rule
(T13). As mentioned by Lane (2000), such a policy generates large ￿ uctuations
in output and in￿ ation in the member countries, even if union-wide aggregate
output and in￿ ation display zero volatility.
A national cost-push shock a⁄ects aggregate in￿ ation and the in￿ ation di⁄er-
ential. Suppose that Home trade unions successfully bargain for a higher wage
("H
t > 0 and "F
t = 0). Home producer price in￿ ation goes up, so does union
in￿ ation. Since Home￿ s terms of trade deteriorate, consumers switch from Home
to Foreign goods, yH
t decreases, yF
t increases. The decline in the demand for
Home goods mitigates the impact e⁄ect of a higher "H
t on ￿H
t , the higher de-
mand for Foreign goods causes Foreign in￿ ation to rise. The optimal response
of the central bank to the idiosyncratic cost shock is parameter dependent, see
(T13). A dominating demand channel, ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿z > 0, is su¢ cient for a rise
in the interest rate lowering the demand for both Home and Foreign goods.
The overall e⁄ect on Home output is negative (see (T17)), the overall e⁄ect on
Home in￿ ation is ambiguous (see (T18)). As indicated by (T19), the net e⁄ect
on Foreign output depends on the parameter constellation, all three signs are
possible. Foreign in￿ ation unambiguously increases, see (T20).
For a strong cost channel, the optimal response to the increase in aggregate
in￿ ation is a decline in the interest rate. The change in Home output is ambigu-
ous now, the decline in the interest rate countervails the terms of trade e⁄ect.
17Concerning Foreign output the terms of trade e⁄ect and the interest rate decline
reinforce each other, Foreign output goes up, see (T19).
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the conduct of optimal monetary policy in the presence
of a cost channel of monetary transmission. The framework is a two-country
New Keynesian model, where these countries constitute a currency union with
a single central bank. The existence of a cost channel implies that a change
in the interest rate now a⁄ects both the demand- and the supply-side of the
economies. There is now a meaningful trade-o⁄ between stabilising union in￿ a-
tion and stabilising the union output gap. It is shown that the optimal response
to aggregate, asymmetric and idiosyncratic shocks very much depends on the
strength of the cost channel. The cost channel makes monetary policy less
e⁄ective in combatting in￿ ation, but the optimal response to the decline in ef-
fectiveness is a stronger use of the instrument. For a strong cost channel the
interest rate turns into a supply-side instrument. In order to reduce in￿ ation, a
direct cut in marginal costs is more e⁄ective than a decline in marginal costs via
lower aggregate demand. An analogous result holds for an aggregate cost-push
shock. For perfect asymmetric shocks we replicate the "do nothing"-result of
Lane (2000). Despite the distribution of in￿ ation, production and employment
varies across countries with the relative strength of the cost channel, the mon-
etary authority does not react to this kind of shocks. Finally, we derive the
optimal response to idiosyncratic shocks. We show how the sign and size of the
spillover e⁄ects depend on the strength of the cost channel.
The model developed in this paper is a very simple one. It can be extended
in di⁄erent directions. These include: (i) allowing for country-speci￿c cost
channels; (ii) introducing national ￿scal authorities which maximise national
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